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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: An application of AcciMap to identify and analyse the causes 
of the Eastern Star and Sewol Casualties 
 
Degree: MSc 
Thanks to the technological advances and strengthened system of global maritime 
governance especially by IMO, occurrence of accidents in the maritime domain has 
not increased with the continuing seaborne trade. However, potential risks on the ships 
that were not under IMO regime should be concerned more seriously especially after 
the two Asian casualties of Eastern Star and Sewol occurred in recent years. 
 
The purpose of this research is to apply a recognized accident investigation method to 
identify and analyse the causes of these tragedies and give some recommendations 
based on the outcome of the research. After comparing with several popular 
investigation methods, AcciMap was chosen as a harmonized approach to make the 
research due to its advantages in organizational factors analysis and corresponding 
recommendations exportation. The research contributes progresses in the application 
of AcciMap in two significant events and provided some measures to prevent 
repetitions of such disasters. However, further research is needed to further develop 
the method due to the constraints in the approach itself but also due to weakness in 
information collection and research limitations as well.  
 
KEYWORDS: Organizational Factors, ActorMap, AcciMap, Eastern Star, 
Sewol, Factual information, Identified Failures. 
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1 Introduction 
2.1 Background 
It is well accepted that 90% of the global trade is carried out by the shipping industry (George, 
2013). With the continued increase in population, the existing economy is keeping a growing trend 
and resulting in a rise in the demand for seaborne trade. This trend is primarily driven by growth 
and expansion in developing countries, leading to changes in trading patterns. (Figure 1) 
 
 
Figure 1. World Economy and Seaborne Trade, 1985-2014(UNCTAD, 2015a; UNCTAD, 2015b) 
 
On the other hand, continuing seaborne trade also means high potential maritime safety risks. 
Among others, thanks to the technological advances and the strengthened system of global 
maritime governance especially by IMO (Figure 2), marine casualties and incidents have not 
increased with the improving contributions to the economy and have maintained at a stable level or 
have even declined a little in recent years. (Figure 3) 
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Figure 2. Instruments over Time (IMO, 2016a) 
 
IMO's main objective is to strengthen the system of global maritime legislation for all nations 
involved in international shipping. As the only forum in which to develop global regulation that 
can be uniformly applied, IMO developed an increasing number of instruments to assure the safe 
and environmental navigation especially in recent years. Figure 2 illustrates the yearly and 
cumulative number of different instruments from 1958 up to 2014. These instruments contributed 
to maritime safety among the member states, official maritime industry associations and other 
stakeholders. 
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Figure 3. Marine Casualties and Incidents (IMO, 2016b) 
Admittedly, IMO instruments regulate international shipping and domestic ships do not 
necessarily need to follow this regime, except national authorities and administration implement 
those rules and regulations also to national domestic shipping. Different countries have found 
different approaches to regulate the non-convention vessels. China, for example has made a great 
contribution in its economic growth in recent years and waterborne trade has played a vital role in 
improving national economy. Besides paying the attention towards the development of waterborne 
transportation, China has also undertaken steps to enhance maritime safety by issuing regulations 
on the safety management of inland waterways on the sidelines of IMO regulations. Training 
mechanisms for mariners have been augmented by developed and applied new technologies in 
domestic waters. Statistics for the most important inland river of Changjiang indicates steady 
decline in marine casualties and incidents in recent years. (Figure4).  
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Number of marine casualties and incidents in Changjiang 2010-2014 
           
Figure 4. Number of marine casualties and incidents in Changjiang 2010-2014 
Source: State of Administration of Work Safety  
 
However, compared with the IMO regulatory framework vessels, the regulations for 
non-convention ships are often not as elaborate and highly developed as the IMO general safety 
and environmental protection regime. Potential risks are much higher due to the lower standards 
and less qualified crew. Eastern Star accident was reflection of such standards that occurred on 01 
June 2015 resulting in 442 deaths. Dramatically, a similar accident of the Sewol ferry took place 
in Republic of Korea a year before the Eastern Star casualty. Ferry Sewol sank in the morning of 
16 April 2014, on a route from Incheon to Jeju resulting in 304 deaths including passengers and 
crew.  
 
These accidents highlighted negligent behaviour of respective governments and administrations 
and also frustrated the confidence of worldwide maritime safety. Thus, it is pertinent to identify 
and analyze the causes, and especially the human factors leading to the two Asian casualties in 
order to avert occurrence of such disasters along with improvement of maritime safety of 
non-SOLAS ships in the future. 
235
196
153
168
125
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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2.2 Literature review 
As required by the Casualty Investigation Code (CIC) (IMO, 2008) and implemented by the 
majority of States, the accident investigation, among numerous approaches to be applied to 
improve safety performance on board, is one of several widely utilized approaches to achieve 
safety (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004). According to Harms-Ringdahl’s argument, accident investigation 
is the “collection and examination of facts related to an occurred specific event”. Along with this 
useful and positive function, most major improvements or modifications to a maritime legislative 
system, criticized as the “disaster-driven system”, are often carried out after lessons learned from 
major accidents (Jalonen & Salmi, 2009). Additionally, in accordance with risk assessment, 
analysis of an accident plays an indispensable role for setting priorities and identifying hazardous 
sources (Svedung, 2000). However, most of the current maritime accident investigation systems 
encourage investigators to determine what happened during an event and how the event occurred, 
rather than why the event occurred (Lee N., Donald K, & Randal L, 2005). This is often coupled 
with the lack of knowledge and appreciation for the organizational context in which human error is 
made (Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009). To shun negative influence, a better understanding and 
workable analysis causation model to direct accident investigation methodology is an alternative 
need. (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016) 
 
Several authors (e.g., Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997), while discussing the ‘‘safety space”, based 
on their theories, have argued that socio-technical systems tend to drift toward states of higher risk. 
The performance of the actors within a socio-technical system is always constrained by the 
surroundings, e.g., administrative, competitiveness, economic benefits and safety related 
constraints, thereby creating a small space of freedom for designers, operators, and managers to 
perform their work tasks with little considerations given to the feasibility and consequences 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Thus, accident analysis should incorporate the circumstances that induce 
variation in behaviors as well as the dysfunctional interactions among correctly operating 
components. Several accident analysis models e.g., Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012), Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990; 1997; 2008), AcciMap 
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(Rasmussen, 1997), have been developed on the basis of the systems approach (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013).  
 
Chinese scholars have researched on risk management, accident investigations, policies, and 
suggestions and so on at the domestic level. They have tried to summarize some basic 
characteristics of the risk management in water transportation through the statistics of accidents 
that have happened in recent years (Li, 2007) and present an anticipation of accident (Chen, 
2002). Some have focused on accident analysis in a certain areas, such as Shanghai (Zhang, 
2013), Zhoushan (Xu, He&Lv, 2008), Xiamen (Wang, 2006) and Beihai (Long, 2012) and 
provided some countermeasures to prevent risks from the view of legislation, the emergency 
response system and infrastructure improvements. The risk management in Ro-Ro passenger 
ships was also a popular researching aspect especially after the “11.24”1 marine disaster of 
China. (Zhang, 2010) Some others introduced updated regulations of the IMO and their effects 
on Chinese passenger ships (Liu, 2010). Also researches related to the spot supervision 
(Chen&Zhang, 2007), status analysis (Quan, 2010), safety management (Li&Jin, 2009) and 
safety assessment (Hong&Yu, 2000) as well as safety management from governmental view (Liu, 
2002) on Ro-Ro passenger ships. Research has been undertaken in the safety management of 
passenger ships in domestic waters on the aspects of supervision on tour ships (Liu, 2015), 
human factors (Zhang, 2001), technological analysis (Zhang, 2014), small ships management (Ji, 
2015) and so on. Relevant research on maritime management from the public’s service view 
(GAO, 2011), construction of the maritime wet (Han, 2011) and maritime management (Yu, 
2008) were also considered by scholars.  
 
Post Sewol accident, few Chinese scholars carried out researches on the accident and provided 
recommendations. Cause analysis on the Sewol was discussed in various articles (Wu, 2014) and 
(Li & Wu, 2014), which was also made in 2015 (Mi &Zhao, 2015). Further discussions about 
                                                 
1 The Ro-Ro passenger ship “ Dashun”, owned by Yantai Ferry Company of the Shandong Province, capsized on 24 November 
1999 while navigating around the sea areas of Yantai (a city of Shandong Province) leading to fatal consequences with 280 
deaths and an economic loss of 90 million RMB. 
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human factors in the accident (Guo, 2014), influence to the maritime safety regime of the 
Republic of Korea, search & rescue (Xu, 2015), legal view (Wang, 2015) and references for 
China government from the accident (Wang, 2015) were developed by Chinese scholars. 
 
Despite of above research and discussions, the underlying causes of the Eastern Star needs to be 
identified and analysed in order to acquaint with the situation and issues of Chinese maritime 
safety management in inland waterways by using a schematic approach. In addition, it is also 
imperative to compare the Sewol and Eastern Star accidents to learn more from these tragedies 
and avoid the occurrence of similar accidents in the future. 
2.3 Objectives of the study 
This study attempts to achieve the following objectives:  
(1) Analysis of the maritime safety situation of the inland waterways of China. 
(2) Providing detailed narratives of the Eastern Star and Sewol accidents in detail. 
(3) Explaining how AcciMap can contribute to identification of causes and its application in 
analysing failures of the two Asian accidents. 
(4) Comparing similarities and differences in the two Asian casualties. 
(5) Providing recommendations in the maritime safety management for non-SOLAS 
passenger ships especially for the Chinese government’s reference. 
2.4 Limitations of the study  
There are two main limitations to this study. The first concerns the materials sources. It is 
difficult to make an objective evaluation about the two casualties due to the limited information 
achieved from investigation reports. The Eastern Star accident occurred in the year 2015 and 
therefore a very scarce academic analysis is available for reference. Secondly, numerous 
departments were involved in the casualty making it more multifaceted. It is difficult to give a 
complete and accurate description of the relationship. A detailed investigation report for accident 
of ferry Sewol was published but in local language and English version available from English 
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website was limited. Hence, it poses a great challenge to make an accurate evaluation when 
depending on second-hand data and materials. 
 
The second limitation lies in the approach itself. It is critical to choose a suitable model to 
analyse the causes since every model has its advantages and disadvantages. Though AcciMap has 
the advantage in most aspects concerning this study, however, disadvantage exists in terms of the 
quality of the analysis. Analysis depends on the quality of accident reports that is subjective 
since AcciMap analysis does not provide a method to develop corrective measures. 
2.5 Study Plan  
This dissertation is mainly divided into seven main chapters. The first chapter begins with a 
preliminary explanatory background of the topic giving the motivation and objectives for the 
research. Factual information of the two Asian casualties of Eastern Star and Sewol is described 
separately in Chapter Two. Chapter Three introduces the methodology of AcciMap used in this 
study. The application of AcciMap in the two casualties of Eastern Star in China and Sewol in 
the Republic of Korea is illustrated in Chapter Four. Chapter Five involves comparison of the 
two Asian accidents. Chapter Six elaborates about findings and further discussions. The 
concluding parts are placed in Chapter Seven followed by recommendations on non-SOLAS 
ships risk management for the reference by governments in the future.  
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2 Factual information of the two Asian casualties 
2.1 Factual information of the Eastern Star Casualty in China 
2.1.1Casualty brief 
At 21:30 on June 1, 2015, the Eastern Star Cruise, owned by the Chongqing Oriental Steamship 
Company enroute from Nanjing to Chongqing encountered a severe thunderstorm and capsized 
in short span of time while navigating in the middle of the Yangtze River in the Jianli waters of 
China. On 13 June, a total of 442 deaths were confirmed and only 12 persons were rescued. It 
was the deadliest peacetime maritime disaster in China's history and the worst since 
the Taiping steamer sinking in 1949, which killed over 1,500 persons.  
 
The Eastern Star was a river cruise ship operating in the Three Gorges region of inland China, 
constructed in February 1994 and retrofitted in 1997, 2008 and 2015. The inclement weather was 
cited as primary reason by the investigation report issued at the end of year 2015. 
2.1.2 Particulars of the ship  
Table 1. Particulars of the Eastern star ship 
Name of ship Dongfangzhixing, 
Translated as Eastern Star 
Type Cruise ship 
Length 76.5m 
Beam 14m 
Extreme Vessel Breath 12.4m 
Height 18.6m 
Depth 3.1m 
Draught 2.5m 
Load Draught 2.16m 
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Tonnage 2200 
Full load displacement 890.602 
Rated Power 441.00kw ×2 
Capacity 534 
Capacity of Crew 50 
Registered owner Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation 
Manager Same with the owner 
 
The Eastern Star was a pointed stern steel ship with double bottoms (See picture 5) and was first 
built in 1994 by the Chuandong shipyard. When departing from Nanjing port, the ship was 
equipped with an AIS (B), a GPS, a tester, 2 navigation radar, a ECS and 3 searchlights as well 
as 2 VHF radiotelephones, 2 portable VHF radiotelephones and a set of external PA.  
 
 
Figure 5. The full image of Eastern Star 
Source: Wikipedia 
2.1.3 Ship certifications 
After investigation, the certificates of the Eastern Star were deemed complete and valid. The 
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certifications held are listed as follows: 
 Certificate of nationality of the ship, 
 Ship minimum safe manning certificate,  
 Inland vessels airworthiness certificate, 
 Rivers and Three Gorges ship sailing certificate, 
 Inland vessels Sewage Pollution Prevention Certificate, 
 Inland Ship Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate, 
 Inland Tonnage certificate, 
 Inland load line certificate, 
 Inland passenger ship certificate, 
 Document of Compliance (copy), 
 Safety Management Certificate.   
2.1.4 History of the voyage 
The cruise Eastern star departed from the eastern city of Nanjing and was sailing to Chongqing 
in the southwest via the Three Gorges - a journey of approximately 1,500km (930 miles). The 
Eastern Star departed Wumadu pier of Nanjing Port on 28 May 2015 at 1300 hours and sailed 
upstream in the Yangzi River. Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) to the destination Chongqing 
Port was at 0630 hours on 07 June 2015. The status of the Eastern Star during sailing is listed as 
follows. 
 Crew: 46,  
 Passengers: 398, 
 Fuel oil: 30 tons,  
 Fresh water: 17 tons,  
 Ballast water: 3 tons,  
 Forward & aft draught: 2.10 meters, even keel.  
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Table 2. Logbook of the Eastern Star 
Time Event 
2103 Navigated to the water area around “No.1 Buoy of Tianzi”. Ship speed 14 km/h. 
Lighting and drizzling. 
2121 Maximum wind speed 24.6 m/s (Bf 10). Low visibility. Captain ordered to Chief 
Officer (C/O) to slow down speed, altered small rudder angle to port, and intended 
to anchor in the water area near the starboard side of the river. Ship speed 12.0 
km/h. 
2123 Ship speed 2.2km/h, and gradually reduced to 0. 
2124 Ship started to go astern due to the influence of strong wind. Ship speed 4.0 km/h 
astern. 
2125 Ship speed 5.6km/h astern. Captain ordered C/O to increase the engine speed. 
2126 Ship speed reduced to 5.0 km/h astern. Suddenly encountered downburst storm, the 
maximum wind speed increased to 32-38m/s (Bf 12-13). 
2129 Ship speed reduced to 4.0 km/h astern by the effects of the engine and rudder. 
2130 Ship started to turn and wind angle increased under the effect of the strong storm. 
The ship was not under control. Ship speed increased to 6 km/h astern. Later on, the 
ship suddenly listed to starboard and started to flood. 
2131 Main engine stopped. Heavily listed to starboard. 
2132 The Eastern Star Capsized. AIS and GPS signals disappeared. 
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Figure 6. The sinking timeline of Eastern star 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Transport satellite data 
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2.1.5 Environmental conditions 
A squall line system appeared "above the waters where Eastern Star" navigated accompanied by 
a downburst, tornadoes, other short-term local heavy rainfall as well as severe convective 
weather at the time of accident and therefore the ferry capsized suffering strong storms.  
 
The hydrology report indicated that no shallow patches, obstacles, Malaysia Island riverbed 
morphology were found and the Shoal pattern was basically stable with a smooth flow. 
2.1.6 Search and Rescue (SAR) 
SAR operations were launched immediately for saving passengers and crew. The operations 
reached full scale about twelve hours after the accident. SAR operations were observed from 
highest echelons in the Government directly from Communist Party General Secretary Xi 
Jinping and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Rescue efforts were overseen personally by Premier Li 
Keqiang, Vice Premier Ma Kai and State Councillor Yang Jing. 82 people were confirmed dead 
by 04 June, with few bodies washed ashore 50 km (31 mi) downstream from the wreck. Ship’s 
captain and engineer were rescued along with 12 people in the immediate aftermath. 
2.1.7 Summary 
On 01 June 2015, at 21:30 Beijing Time, the passenger cruise Eastern Star capsized immediately 
after encountering a severe thunderstorm when navigating in the Jianli waters of Yangtze River 
of China. 442 deaths were confirmed in the disaster. According to the investigation report, 
inclement weather was the main cause of the casualty. However, 45 persons who came from 12 
departments were punished due to their liabilities.  
2.2 Factual information of the Sewol Casualty in the Republic of Korea 
2.2.1 Casualty brief 
The sinking of the ferry Sewol occurred in the early hours of 16 April 2014, enroute from 
Incheon to Jeju in the Republic of Korea. Ferry had embarked 476 passengers that included 
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mostly students from secondary school, Danwon High School (Ansan City). Distress signal was 
passed by vessel at 0858 hours (Korea Standard Time) from a range of 2.7 km (1.7 nm) north of 
Byeongpungdo. 172 people were rescued during SAR efforts and fishing boats and other 
commercial vessels rescued more than half of them. The Republic of Korean Coast Guard 
vessels arrived on scene approximately 40 minutes after the accident. In all, 304 passengers and 
crewmembers lost their lives in the disaster.   
2.2.2 Particulars of the ship  
Table 3. Particulars of the Sewol  
Name of ship MV Sewol 
Type RoRo passenger ferry 
Builder  Hayashikane Dockyard Co., Ltd, Japan 
Year 1994 
Class Korean Register of shipping (since 2012) 
Port of registry Incheon, the Republic of Korea (since 2012) 
Gross tonnage 6825 GT 
Length over all 145.61m 
Beam 22.00m 
Depth 6.25m 
Load Draught 2.16m 
Maximum speed 22kn 
Capacity 956 persons (921 passengers +35 crew), 180 vehicles and 
154 regular cargo containers. 
 
The Sewol was a Ro-Ro ferry built by the Japanese company Hayashikane Shipbuilding & 
Engineering Co. Ltd. in 1994. The ferry was capable of carrying 956 people onboard including 
crew. It had a legal carrying capacity for 180 vehicles and 154 regular cargo containers. The 
maximum designed speed of the ship was 22 knots (41km/h; 25mph). The ship formerly 
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belonged to Japan Oshima Transport Co., Ltd. (headquartered in Kagoshima Prefecture). 
Chonghaejin Marine purchased the ferry in 2012. It was renamed as Motor Vessel (MV) Sewol 
that was 18 years old and dilapidated. Initially it was named as Ferry Naminoue and was 
operated as a transport ship for cargo and passengers by the Japanese company A-Line Ferry 
from 1994 to 2012. Thereafter it was registered by Chonghaejin and underwent modifications 
from 12 October 2012 to February 12, 2013. These modifications were later found to be based on 
an illegal redesign of the ship.  
 
 
Figure 7.The image of Sewol ferry 
Source: Korea Register of shipping, Yonhap 
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2.2.3 Sinking description  
Table 4. Sewol sinking description  
Time Event 
0800 The 25-year-old third mate, Park Han-gyeol, began her scheduled four-hour shift on 
the bridge. 
08:48 Right before 8:48 a.m., Cho steered the ship on a course of 135 degrees, 
or southeast. At 8:48, Third Mate Park, who was monitoring the radar and radio in 
the ship, came to conclusion that there was another ship approaching on a collision 
course and therefore ordered to Helmsman Cho to turn the ship, initially by 5 degrees 
to 140 degrees and then to 145 degrees. Cho reacted to Park's orders and turned to 
starboard to 145 degrees.  
0849 The second turn to course 145 (10 degrees) in one second, from 8:49:12 to 8:49:13, is 
contemplated to be sharp in the context that generally large passenger ships would 
take two minutes to make a five-degree turn. When the chief engineer was enquired 
about the situation, Cho replied that the "steering gear was not working." Due to the 
imbalance, Park ordered Cho to balance the ship to "Port," but this order was 
misheard as a Korean word meaning to 'turn in the opposite direction,' a mishearing 
that did not affect the meaning. The chief engineer testified that the ship commenced 
tilting precisely after Park's last order.  
0850 The chief engineer ordered an evacuation of the engine room through a call to the 
assistant engineer. With the engines off, Sewol became unable to change directions 
and began drifting sideways. 
0852 Choi Duk-ha, a Danwon high school student aboard the ferry at 8:52 a.m., made the 
first emergency call; he called the national emergency service number and reported to 
the Jeollanam-do fire station that Sewol was capsizing. 
0855 At 8:55 a.m., Sewol's crew made their first distress call to the Jeju vessel traffic 
service requesting them to notify the Coast Guard since the ferry was rolling and in 
danger. 
0930 Around 9:30 a.m., the captain ordered to abandon the ship, though the order may not 
have been relayed to all the passengers. 
1118 At 1118 hours approximately, the bow of the ship was submerged, with a section of 
the hull about 2 meters (6 ft. 7 in) high and 20 to 30 meters (66 to 98 ft.) long showing 
above the water. 
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Figure. 8 The route of Sewol ferry (Source: Wikipedia) 
2.2.4 Captain, crew and passengers 
The crew made seven phone calls with staff from Chonghaejin Marine. The passengers were 
instructed to stay in their cabins while the captain and crewmembers abandoned the ship. The 
captain, chief engineer and the chief and second mate were the first one to be rescued. The 
captain was rescued at approximately 0946 hours. As the ship capsized, some passengers 
followed the announcements to stay put, even as the water came in. Most of the student 
passengers obeyed the announcements. Some passengers who climbed to the top of the ship or 
jumped into the water were rescued. Videos recorded by passengers during the capsizing were 
recovered. The recordings included announcements instructing passengers to stay in place and 
put on life jackets, while some videos showed passengers joking around, putting on life jackets 
and bidding farewell.  
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Passengers made calls, sent text messages and KakaoTalk mobile messages during the capsizing 
of ferry. The last message was sent at 1017 hours. Text messages and social media posts 
allegedly made by survivors after the capsizing were circulated in the media, but an investigation 
by the Cyber Terror Response Centre found that passengers did not use their phones between 
1200 hours on 16 April and 1000 hours on 17 April. All the reported survivors' messages were 
termed to be fake.  
2.2.5 Search and Rescue 
The SAR activities are extracted from the accident investigation report and summarized in the 
Table 5 (see next page). 
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Table 5. The SAR activities for Sewol 
Time (Korea Standard Time) SAR activities 
16th of April 
8:58  Sewol started to flood and sinking. Korea coast guard (KCG) 
receive information from one student’s parent 
9:00 Sewol sent out the SOS alarm, KCG sent out rescue team 
9:30-9:40 Ship from KCG arrive the site of accident following by 
helicopter. Some commercial ships joined the SAR.  
Sewol capsized and sinking, 90% of the ship was flooded. 
10:00-10:20 About 120 passengers were rescued 
10:55 Korea Navy sent out about 20 ships and one helicopter to 
rescue. 
Korea Air force sent out 46 lifeboats by transport aircraft. 
11:00 Sewol almost sank into water totally. 
14:00 Professional rescue people arrived. 
15:00 
USA Navy arrived; however, the rescue was interrupted due to 
the bad weather and lack of lighting at night. 
17:00 16 helicopters and 24 ships joint the SAR. Fishing vessels in 
the vicinity also joint. 
20:00 Underwater SAR was interrupted due to the bad weather. 
17th of April Flare burst was used by KCG to restart underwater SAR. 
Ship and helicopters from Navy arrived. 
Divers cannot enter into ship as the low visibility underwater. 
280 passengers still missing. 
18th of April The bow of the Sewol sank into the water.  
Divers successfully entered into ship. 
19th of April 3 dead bodies were rescued at the first attempt of entering into 
the ship 
The Korea government and civil groups conducted the following SAR activities. 
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2.2.6 Summary of the Sewol accident 
On 16 April 2014, the Sewol capsized and sank 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi) off Donggeochado,  
and the south Jeolla Province. Sewol was on the passage from Incheon to Jeju. A total of 304 
people were killed in the accident.  
 
The Government's Board of Audit and Inspection of the Republic of Korea revealed that Korean 
Register's licensing was based on falsified documents. The amount of cargo carried was twice as 
the legal limit. Investigation into accident revealed that the ship was carrying 124 cars, 56 trucks, 
and 1157 tons of cargo.  
2.3 Conclusions derived from of the two accidents 
From the factual information, except for the bad weather, illegal modifications on the ship, 
loopholes in the management regime of the ship company and the inadequate surveillance from all 
levels of administrations were the main contributing factors to the Eastern Star accident. 
Coincidently, the Eastern Star and the Sewol accidents had some major common aspects. They 
both occurred on domestic ships and resulted in tremendous number of deaths. Both ships caught 
in the accidents were initially constructed in 1994 and were retrofitted several times. The 
long-time of sea service and illegal modifications of the two ships, combining with unfavourable 
external factors, caused the tragedies.   
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3 Methodology of the study 
3.1 Background 
Derived from UNCLOS, there are a number of IMO conventions requiring administrations to 
investigate any casualty that ships flying their flag. Among others, there are the SOLAS 
regulations I/21, MARPOL and Load Lines Conventions, warranting investigations to provide 
the findings from those investigations to the organisation. The new Code of International 
Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or 
Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code) was adapted at the 84th session of the MSC in 
May 2008 and entered into force on January 2010. The basic idea of Code is to identify the 
necessary changes of existing rules and regulations that are supporting a repetition of an accident 
that resulted in the death, damage to the marine environment and/or total loss of a ship. Accident 
investigations and the improvement of rules and regulations are expected to contribute to 
changes in systems and processes to bring them up to a higher safety level. Same principles 
should be applied to the ships not governed by IMO rules concerning safe navigation and 
protection of marine environment in domestic waters. 
 
It entirely depends on investigators how they investigate any marine accident, since there are a 
variety of different and maybe even competing investigation methods. It seems to be worth to 
research if the use of a harmonized approach to accident investigations can improve the safety 
and efficiency of maritime transportation. Existing approaches to accident investigations are 
typically based on models – as e.g. sequential like fault trees or models that consider the 
organizational context like Reason. These models are linear and have been found not to be 
sufficient enough and result in system approaches. The recently developed and introduced 
AcciMap method is somewhere between a linear organizational model and a system approach. In 
this chapter studies will be carried out in order to find out about the advantages, potentials but 
also shortcomings and or lack of AcciMap approach to meet the aims declared by IMO. These 
investigation methods can also be made applicable in analysing accidents in domestic waters.  
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Based on Rasmussen’s risk management framework, AcciMap (Rasmussen 1997) is a 
systems-based accident analysis method used to graphically depict the decisions, actions and 
failures that contributed to the accident under analysis, along with the relationships between 
them. AcciMap considers failures by operators on the front line and also failures at the higher 
company management, local authority and governmental levels.  
 
Another graphical method, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is used to graphically depict the failures 
involved in accident scenarios. Using tree-like diagrams, failure events are described along with 
their human – and hardware – related causes.  
 
Inspired by Reason’s Swiss cheese model, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS; Wiegmann and Shappell 2003) is a systems-based accident analysis method, 
originally developed for aviation accident analysis purposes but since applied in a range of 
domains, that provides analysts with taxonomies of failure modes across four organisational 
levels (unsafe acts; preconditions for unsafe acts; unsafe supervision; and organisational 
influences). Working backward from the immediate causal factors, analysts classify the errors 
and associated causal factors involved across the four levels using the taxonomies provided.  
 
Viewing accidents as a control problem, Leveson’s STAMP model (Leveson 2004) focuses on 
control failures across the overall work system. STAMP considers various forms of control, 
including managerial, organisational, physical, operational and manufacturing-based controls 
and provides analysts with taxonomy of control failures (Leveson 2009). STAMP also uses 
systems dynamics to investigate the causes of the control failures identified.  
 
Social Network Analysis (SNA; Driskell and Mullen 2004) is used to understand network 
structures via description, visualisation and statistical modelling (Van Duijn and Vermunt 2006). 
When used for accident analysis purposes SNA is used to evaluate the communications failures 
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involved or problems within the social network (e.g. overloaded nodes or communications 
bottlenecks). SNA produces social network diagrams, which depict the connections between 
entities during scenarios of interest. Statistical modelling is then used to analyse the networks 
mathematically in order to quantify aspects of interest.  
 
The propositional network methodology was originally developed for modelling situation 
awareness in complex socio-technical systems (Salmon et al. 2009) and has since been used to 
model the situation awareness-related failures involved in accidents (e.g. Griffin et al. 2010). 
Networks representing situation awareness are constructed and situation awareness failures (e.g. 
lack of awareness, erroneous awareness and failure to communicate key information) are 
identified through network analysis procedures.  
 
Critical Path Analysis (CPA; Baber 2004) is used to model the performance time associated with 
sequences of tasks and has previously been used to model operator response times during 
accident scenarios (e.g. Stanton and Baber 2008). CPA works by modelling task sequences and 
calculating, using standard human response time data and the time required for completion of 
different sequences of tasks.  
 
The Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors (Tracer; 
Shorrock and Kirwan 2002) is both an error prediction and retrospective error analysis method 
having previously been used for the analysis of air traffic control and rail accidents. Tracer uses 
six error taxonomies to investigate the operator errors involved, including the errors themselves, 
performance shaping factors, error detection and recovery strategies. 
  
Unlike the individual methods described above, the Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork 
framework (EAST; Stanton et al. 2005) is an integrated suite of methods used to analyse activity 
in collaborative systems. EAST uses a combination of methods to describe the task, social and 
knowledge networks underlying collaborative activity, including task analysis, social network 
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analysis, network analysis and teamwork assessment methods. Recent applications (e.g. Rafferty 
et al, In Press) have involved using the approach to model accident scenarios.  
 
As listed above, there are a variety of different investigation methods like FTA, HFACS and 
STAMP and they take the advantages in the accident investigations for some cases. After 
comparing with the features of these methods, AcciMap is a harmonized approach to analyse the 
organizational factors and is the most applicable one for this research in the causes identification 
and recommendations suggestion. 
3.2 AcciMap and its features 
The AcciMap method (Rasmussen, 1997; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002) is an accident analysis 
technique based upon the notion that there are multiple levels of causality involved in accidents, 
as put forward in Rasmussen’s (1997) model of risk management. The method presents a 
graphical portrayal of factors within the system that impact the occurrence of an accident. 
Typically, the following six levels of complex socio-technical systems are considered (although 
these can be modified to suit analysis needs): government policy and budgeting; regulatory 
bodies and associations; local area government planning and budgeting (including company 
management); technical and operational management; physical processes and actor activities; 
and equipment and surroundings. Levels 1–4 represent all of the decision-makers that may have 
been involved in the accident scenario, described by levels 5 and 6, through the decisions they 
make in their normal work context (Woo and Vicente, 2003). AcciMap analysis focuses upon the 
causal relationships between these levels that allows for a vertical analysis across the levels of a 
system rather than the horizontal generalisation within individual levels normally found in 
accident analysis methods (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002).  
 
A generalization aggregating accidental courses of the events set is represented by a 
cause-consequence chart. Predictive risk analyses are widely based on these charts (Leveson 
1995). The choice of the critical event reflecting the release of a well-defined source of hazard 
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for example “loss of control of accumulated energy” or “loss of containment of hazardous 
substance”, defines the choice of set to include in a cause-consequent chart. The causal tree 
(among potential causes, the logic relation) is connected by the critical event with a consequent 
event tree (the possible temporal and functional relation among events) clearly reflecting the 
switching of the flow as a result of automatic safety systems or human decisions (Rasmussen & 
Svedung 2000). Controlling the hazardous process at the socio-technical system’s lowest level is 
this analysis’ focus, as shown in the figure below (Qureshi, n.d.) 
 
 
Figure 9. The socio-technical system involved in risk management 
 (Rasmussen, 1997) Source: (Sklet, 2002) 
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Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages in analysing the cases of accident. 
AcciMap shows the causal relations obtained between different technical, psychological, 
organisational, cultural, regulatory, legal and other factors, each of which domains typically have 
their own methods of explanation (for example, psychology does not follow physical laws; 
organisational behaviour is explained using largely different concepts from those of individual 
psychology and regulatory principles are often different from all of those). As one graphic 
method, AcciMap has been very effective in creating an overview of complex occurrences and 
for the communication of assumptions and findings within a risk analysis and design team. 
Moreover, AcciMap serves to identify relevant decision-makers and the normal work situation in 
which they influence and condition possible accidents. The focus is not the traditional search for 
“management errors” and the like. Therefore, the AcciMap representing the conditioning system 
of one particular accident is well suited as a “conversation piece” to support discussion with the 
relevant decision-makers. The basic AcciMap represents the conditioning system and the flow of 
events from one particular accident. Suggestion of improvements by changes identified from this 
map will therefore very likely be ad hoc. A generalization is necessary based on a set of accident 
scenarios.  
 
As every coin has two sides, the features of AcciMap can be illustrated as follows from its 
strengths and limitations.  
 
Strengths:  
(1) An AcciMap is intuitively easy to understand. It is based on a sound theoretical model 
and is simple to learn and use. 
(2) An AcciMap representation requires the analyst to consider all factors in various levels in 
the organizational model and explicitly to check to see what the causal relations between 
any factors in different levels of the model might be. Causal connections are thus 
observed which might be missed if the domains in the organizational model are 
considered separately.  
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(3) AcciMap enables identification of system-wide errors leading to the occurrence of the 
accident at the sharp end. The complete accident aetiology is exposed. 
(4) Its output offers an exhaustive analysis of accidents and incidents. 
(5) It provides a clear visual interpretation of the accident aetiology.  
(6) It is a generic approach that has been applied across many domains.  
(7) Considering the different levels involved in the accident, it enables an extended timeline 
of causality to be established.  
(8) It focuses on systematic improvements rather than focusing on blaming individuals. 
(Salmon, 2011) 
 
Limitations:  
(1) The counterfactual condition used to determine causality is informal; it is not provided 
with formal semantics. Thus, it is dependent on the intuition and personal judgement of 
the investigator.  
(2) There is no criterion to determine whether an organizational model is adequate; the 
model comes from outside the analysis.  
(3) The level of generality of the factors expressed in the nodes is high; they can be very 
abstract. An attempt to derive countermeasures is correspondingly vague.  
(4) The AcciMap method provides only a weak analytical approach to physical failures or 
identifying inappropriate features of the physical part of the system.  
(5) An AcciMap does not represent the results of a causal analysis by itself. It requires a 
textual expression of the results and serves to illustrate or summarise that text.  
(6) The result of an AcciMap analysis is relatively lightly constrained; it is thus possible to 
derive different AcciMap of the same incident showing different sets of causes, 
depending on the analyst's focus. (Salmon, 2011) 
3.3 Summary 
AcciMap is one of the major graphic methods in accident analysis, although it has several 
 29 
limitations. AcciMap requires as many factors as the analyst can consider so that the causal 
connections are observed in a simple and clear way. It will serve to identify the decision-makers 
having a potential for improving safety and to support communication with the various 
disciplines relevant for cross-disciplinary cooperation in research and design. Compared with 
other models, AcciMap has the advantage in the organizational factors analysis and also is easy 
to understand. 
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4 Application case studies 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in above chapters, AcciMap is a method somewhere between a linear 
organizational model and a system approach, which takes advantage of organizational factors in 
accident investigation. Though the accidents did not happen on the ships under IMO’s regime, 
the approach itself should, nevertheless, be effective. In this research, organizational factors in 
the Eastern Star and Sewol accidents will be identified and analysed carefully in order to identify 
weaknesses in domestic marine safety management. After a comparison of accident analysis 
methods, AcciMap was chosen for application to the two accidents for its strengths in serving the 
research purpose. 
 
In order to explain the AcciMap and test its application to the accidents, several workshops were 
organized during this research. On June 8, the first workshop focusing on the AcciMap and its 
possible application to the Eastern Star casualty was held in WMU. Two Professors and two 
researchers from the MARISA Group and three students participated in the seminar. After an 
introduction to the AcciMap and a brief description of the Eastern Star casualty, the possible 
factors contributing to the casualty were listed according to the scheme of the AcciMap. And the 
relationship among the different departments was clarified. The seminar lasted two and half 
hours and an AcciMap of the Eastern Star incident was draft based on the investigation report.  
 
To identify the actors involved in the Eastern Star incident more exactly, and based on the results 
of the first workshop, a second workshop was held on June 13 in WMU. A professor and a 
researcher from the MARISA Group and two students participated in the workshop. After 
confirmation from  Chinese students with the investigation report, an ActorMap was drafted 
and the relationship of these actors was clarified. In addition, a micro ActorMap of the shipping 
company was created at the same time.  
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4.2 An ActorMap of Eastern Star  
After the preparation work, an ActorMap will be constructed first. The ActorMap is a graph 
identifying the various organizational bodies contributing to the landscape in which accidents 
flow and defining the relationship among actors. Due to the complexity, this representation tends 
to be hierarchically, ordered in a number of levels: 
 Government,  
 Regulatory bodies & Associations,  
 Regional & Local government, 
 Company. 
 
The organizations involved in an accident can be listed according to the levels, and relevant 
relationships will be clearly described in a graph. In this way, the ActorMap can help provide an 
understanding of the organizational context. 
4.2.1Liable departments according to the investigation report 
Table 6. Departments and people were punished for Eastern Star accident 
Name of department Number of people to be punished 
Ship company 9 
Yueyang (a city of Hunan Province) MSA 3 
Wanzhou (a district of Chongqing City) Maritime division 4 
Wushan (a district of Chongqing City) Maritime division 1 
Chaotianmen (a district of Chongqing City) Maritime division 1 
Chongqing (Provincial rank city) MSA 3 
Changjiang MSA 4 
Changjiang River Administration of Navigational Affairs 3 
Wanzhou Navigational Affairs Administration 10 
Wanzhou SASAC 3 
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Wanzhou Transport Committee 1 
Wanzhou district government 3 
Altogether 45 
 
From the Table 6, Wanzhou Navigational Affairs Administration and the shipping company take 
the main liability. Local administrations take full liability according to the governmental system in 
China. However, the central government takes responsibility for surveillance. 
 
4.2.2 Constructing an ActorMap of Eastern Star  
For the case of the Eastern Star, according to the investigation report, actors can be identified as 
in the map shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. ActorMap of Eastern Star casualty 
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4.2.3 Identify Actors and their responsibilities in Eastern Star 
According to the above map and table, both central and local governments as well as some 
organizations are involved in the accident. The departments are introduced as follows and some 
important departments’ responsibilities are listed in Tables 7-10. 
 
At the government level, the Ministry of Transport (MOT), the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) and China Meteorological Administration (CMA) under the 
State Council were involved in the accident according to the investigation report. Apart from the 
above organizations listed in the tables, China Meteorological Administration (CMA) is 
responsible for providing the weather forecast information and the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) is in charge of the standards of ship design and construction 
related to the Eastern Star. 
 
At the Regulatory bodies & Associations level, China Classification Society (CCS), China 
Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), Chongqing municipal government and Changjiang 
River Administration of Navigational Affairs were involved in the accident. 
 
At the Regional & Local government level, Changjiang MSA, Chongqing Transport Commission 
and SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) of Wanzhou 
District, Chongqing were involved in the accident. 
 
Changjiang MSA is in charge of the MSA Branch, VTS and SAR. Chongqing Transport 
Commission is in charge of local Navigational Affairs Administration, including shipping 
administration and ship inspection. SASAC of Wanzhou District is in charge of the Chongqing 
Eastern Shipping Corporation. 
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Table 7. The Ministry of Transport 
Name of organization Ministry of Transport (MOT) 
Location No.11 Jianguomennei Avenue, Beijing, China 
Main duties As a component department of the State Council, MOT, 
reconstructed in 2008, is responsible for railways, 
roads , highways ,shipping , ports , urban passenger 
transport, civil aviation and so on. 
Institutional settings 17 internal organs (General Office, Comprehensive 
planning Department, Water Board, SAR Centre…); 2 
agencies (Yangtze River Shipping Authority and Zhujiang 
Authority); 7 institutions (China MSA, CCS, Rescue and 
Salvage Bureau, DMU…) directly under MOT 
 
Table 8. China Maritime Safety Administration 
Name of organization China Maritime Safety Administration (China MSA) 
Also called Maritime Bureau of MOT in China 
Location No.11 Jianguomennei Avenue& No.18 Anhuaxili, Beijing, 
China 
Main responsibilities Responsible for the exercise of national water safety 
supervision and the prevention of pollution from ships, 
vessels and marine facilities, maritime security 
management and administrative law enforcement, crew 
administration, fulfilling maritime safety management 
functions of MOT; also responsible for investigating the 
shipwreck.  
Institutional settings 20 internal divisions (Navigation management, ship 
inspection management, crew management, security 
management service, maritime security administration, tube 
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fouling at risk…); 14 branches under China MSA 
(Heilongjiang MSA, Changjiang MSA…); 27 provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities (excluding 
Heilongjiang Province, Guangdong Province, Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region, Hainan Province) 
and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps have local 
maritime bureaus. Local maritime bureaus can be classified 
into provincial, municipal and county levels belonging to 
local governments. China MSA only gives them some 
technological direction. 
 
Table 9.  Changjiang River Administration of Navigational Affairs 
Name of organization Changjiang River Administration of Navigational Affairs of 
MOT (Also translated as Yangtze River Shipping Authority 
and abbreviated as “Changjiang Shipping”) 
Location Wuhan, China 
Main duties Authorized by MOT to take the administrative 
responsibility for the Yangtze River (Yunnan water Fu - 
Shanghai Yangtze River estuary, trunk waterways 2838 
km). In detail as follows: 
1.The drafting of the Yangtze River shipping regulations 
2.Organize the preparation of the Yangtze River shipping 
plan and supervise its implementation 
3.Yangtze River shipping, port and shipping facilities 
administration and industrial management 
4.Quality of passenger and freight transport on the Yangtze 
River, port and shipping facilities engineering quality 
supervision and management 
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5.Yangtze River water safety oversight and shipping Police 
Work 
6.Coordination of 13 provinces related with Yangtze River 
Institutional settings 11 internal divisions (Transport management, safety 
administration, waterway and navigation administration…); 
8 institutions (Changjiang MSA, Changjiang Waterway 
Bureau, Changjiang Three Gorges Navigation Authority…) 
directly under Changjiang Shipping 
 
Table 10. China Classification Society 
Name of organization China Classification Society (CCS) 
Location Headquarters located in Beijing, China 
Number of Staff CCS has about 4,100 employees and has established over 
80 offices both at home and abroad, forming a global 
service network.  
Main responsibilities Founded in 1956, China Classification Society (CCS) is the 
specialized organization in China that provides 
classification services. CCS aims to provide services for 
shipping, shipbuilding, offshore exploration and related 
manufacturing industries and marine insurance by 
furnishing reliable classification requirements and 
providing independent, impartial and integral classification 
and statutory services to ships and offshore installations, for 
the promotion and safeguarding of the safety of life and 
property at sea and for the prevention of pollution to the 
marine environment. 
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4.2.4 Shipping Company 
At the company level, Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation takes direct responsibility for 
the incident. In detail, the Technical & SMS Department, HR, the Transport Department and the 
company-owned shipyard took the liability for the incident. (See Figure 11) 
 
Company 
management
Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation
HR Transport Department
Safety & Technical 
department Shipyard
SMS Division Master 
C/O
Helmsman
Ship construction and 
conversion
Ship maintence
Physical processes 
& activities
Safety Training
 
Figure 11. ActorMap of Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation 
 
In detail, from the information listed above, some important questions during the ship 
construction and safety management can be identified as follows: 
(1) The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) is responsible for the general 
principles and rules for construction of domestic ships. 
(2) Chongqing Navigational Affairs Administration and its Wanzhou branch (including ship 
survey bureau) are in charge of the granting permit, supervision and survey of ship 
construction. 
(3) The ship design institutes would check the ship’s technical information and the Chongqing 
Navigational Affairs Administration and its Wanzhou branch (including ship survey bureau) 
would double check and approve the ship construction plans. Then, the shipyard of 
Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation is in charge of the several conversions of the 
Eastern star. 
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(4) Generally, CCS and its local branches check the stability of ship. Wanzhou Navigational 
Affairs Administration inspected the stability of the Eastern Star.  
(5) Changjiang River Administration of Navigation Affairs is in charge of issuing water transport 
permits to the Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation. 
(6) Changjiang MSA, Chongqing MSA and Wanzhou MSA should be responsible for issuing the 
safety management system from the ISM code to the Chongqing Eastern Shipping 
Corporation and monitoring the safety performance of ships through periodical inspection. 
Besides, Changjiang MSA should also be responsible for supervising and monitoring ship 
navigational safety in the Changjiang River by VTS and other related methods. 
(7) Wanzhou State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration (Wanzhou SAASC) is directly 
in charge of the Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation and supervises the safety 
performance of the shipping company. 
 
4.2.5 Summary 
In China, MOT takes overall responsibility for water transport and China MSA takes 
responsibility for maritime safety administration on behalf of MOT. Considering the importance 
of the Yangtze River, authorized by MOT, Changjiang Shipping takes administrative 
responsibility for the Yangtze River covered trunk waterways of 2838 km and coordinates 
relevant affairs of 13 provinces. CCS, an institution of MOT, provides services for shipping, 
shipbuilding, offshore exploration and related manufacturing industries and marine insurance, 
including drafting the standards for shipping inspection. 
 
At the regional level, the local MSA belongs to its territorial government and receives 
technological direction from MOT’s representative as China MSA and Changjiang Shipping. 
 
In the Eastern Star case, two component departments of the State Council were involved in the 
weather forecasting responsibility of the CMA and standards of ship design and construction 
responsibility of the MIIT. 
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At the company level, Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation belongs to Wanzhou SASAC; 
therefore, SASAC of Wanzhou should be responsible for administrative lapses related to the 
accident. 
4.3 An AcciMap of Eastern Star 
4.3.1 Drawing an AcciMap 
The AcciMap (Rasmussen 1997; Svedung and Rasmussen 2002) is an accident analysis method 
that is used to graphically represent the system-wide causal failures involved in accidents, as 
well as identifying the environmental conditions and physical processes involved. It also focuses 
on the causal flow of events upstream from the accident, looking at the planning, management 
and regulatory bodies that may have contributed in some way (Svedung and Rasmussen 2002). 
Typically, the following six levels of complex socio-technical systems are considered (although 
these can be modified to suit analysis needs): topography and configuration of scenery and 
equipment, accidental flow of events and acts, technical and operational management involved, 
company management and local area planning, regulatory bodies and associations and 
government policy and legislation. 
 
Combining the information above with the investigation report, an AcciMap of Eastern Star can 
be drafted as in Figure 12:
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Figure 12. AcciMap of the Eastern Star casualty 
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4.3.2 Explanations 
Accidental flow of events and acts First, the accident flow of Eastern Star can be outlined with a 
series of events and acts as level 5 with red arrows. The ship encountered severe weather, which 
led to an unsuccessful attempt to maintain maneuverability. It capsized into the river 
immediately and passengers on board had difficulty escaping from the ship. No distress call was 
sent out. The tragedy caused a total of 442 deaths with only 12 persons surviving. 
 
Topography and configuration of scenery and equipment At the time of the accident, a squall 
line system appeared above the waters where the Eastern Star navigated, accompanied with 
downburst, tornadoes, and other short-term local heavy rainfall, as well as severe convective 
weather. Waters where the ferry capsized suffered strong storms with the maximum wind speed 
reaching 32-38m/s (Bf 12-13). The unanticipated tornadoes directly caused the capsizing. 
The extreme weather conditions encountered by the Eastern Star resulted in the loss of stability. 
After the initial construction of the ship, it underwent rehabilitation and technical changes on 
three occasions and the fundamental stability criterion numeral of wind pressure was gradually 
reduced (see Table 11). Although it is still in line with regulatory requirements, the ship will 
capsize when encountering 21.5 m/s beam wind (BF 9) or 32.0 m/s maximum instantaneous 
wind speed (BF 11) with 21.1°~156.6° wind angle according to calculation and experience. The 
navigational area for the Eastern Star is approved as level B, which means it will lose stability 
when subjected to 21.52 m / s (Bf 9). However, at the time of the accident, the wind reached Bf 
12. 
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Table 11. Changes of the stability criterion1  
Years 1994 1997 2008 2015 
Ship stability (weather) criteria (K) 1.355 1.09 1.018 1.014 
Some equipment on the Eastern Star was also problematic. The watertight doors in the engine 
area were left open and beds in the cabins were not well fixed. Additionally, the accident 
happened at night when most people were asleep in their cabins and the rapid development with 
capsizing made the time for escaping extremely limited. 
The captain and crew did not send out any SAR alarm. It was the rescued passengers and a 
passing ship that alerted the SAR authorities. It also took a long time to report to central SAR 
services due to the complicated procedures. 
Technical and operational management involved At the technical and operational level, the 
company manipulated ballast water tanks during the conversion in 2015 and did not report the 
change to authorities. This conversion impaired the stability of the ship. Automatic closing 
devices were not fitted to watertight doors and were not noticed during daily checks. The ship 
was not well maintained and potential risks were not controlled in advance. 
The passengers were organized by a small travel agency in Shanghai named after “Red Sunset 
Group” that was designed for retirees and offered a discounted price in non-peak time. Most of 
the passengers were over 60 years old. The accident happened at about 21:30 when most of the 
passengers were asleep in their cabins due to their habits and the heavy shower. The limitation of 
their mobility and the short response time made it impossible to escape. Most of the passengers 
were not aware of what was happening outside when they lost their lives by drowning with the 
capsizing of the ship.  
 
                                                 
1 The stability criterion, which usually is expressed by the letter K, is one of the important and basic requirements for ship 
stability. It is stipulated that the stability of the ship under the various loading conditions calculated shall be in accordance with 
the following inequality formula of K>1.  
K =lhmin/lw, lhmin means the minimum heeling lever, lw means the wind heeling lever 
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Company management and local area planning At the company management level, Chongqing 
Eastern Shipping Corporation took direct responsibility for the accident. The problematic 
management regime and implementation of regulations in Chongqing Eastern Shipping 
Corporation was exposed following this accident. Some ships with similar routes changed their 
schedules according to the weather forecast and avoided the dangers. However, the Eastern Star 
was already delayed according to the tourist plan in the first two days and was told to regain lost 
time to maintain the original schedule, so it continued navigation under the dangerous weather 
conditions. 
 
The company adjusted the ballast tanks without applying inspections from local professional 
institutions. The captain and senior officers on board had not received adequate training, 
especially for response to extreme weather conditions. When the accident happened, the captain 
did not recognize the potential risks caused by the severe weather. He did not send out a distress 
message or sound an alarm to the whole ship. The captain and crew did not organize any kind of 
evacuation from the ship. The newly hired crew members were not qualified for their positions 
due to inadequate training and careless assessment. The daily security checks were not thorough 
enough to identify problems such as lack of closing appliances to prevent water ingress and 
unfixed beds in cabins. In addition, there were no full-time staffs in charge of ship daily 
maintenance. The monitoring systems were not under dynamic tracking and the VTS operators 
were not following the development. 
 
Regulatory bodies and associations At the Regulatory bodies & Associations level, Changjiang 
River Administration of Navigational Affairs had not effectively implemented the shipping 
administrative department duties and issued waterway transport licenses without careful survey. 
Changjiang MSA did not audit the safety management system of the company strictly and failed 
to identify regulatory loopholes. The crew training was not supervised effectively. The 
problematic modifications, including ballast water tank adjustments and narrowing of escape 
routes, were not noticed. The lack of closing devices required by regulations was not detected 
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during inspections. Yueyang MSA did not implement the requirements from MOT and 
Changjiang MSA to maintain tracking and monitoring of every passenger ship navigating in 
Changjiang. The operational limits at wind force BF 9 were not safe enough considering the poor 
condition of some old ships. 
 
The surveillance system of relevant local administrations did not play a full role in safety 
management on ships. Local ship inspection departments like Chongqing Navigational Affairs 
Administration (Chongqing Inspection Bureau is included) and Wanzhou District Navigational 
Affairs Administration (Wanzhou Ship Inspection Bureau is included) did not make a serious 
inspection on Eastern Star after it was reconstructed and did not find the problems of its illegal 
adjustment of ballast tanks and poor equipment in cabins. The certificates were issued without 
serious surveys and inspections. The crew training and assessment was not under effective 
supervision. The higher levels of administration like the Chongqing Transport Commission also 
did not conduct an effective surveillance for all of these potential safety risks. 
 
As the lead department of Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation, Wanzhou District SASAC 
did not carry out strict safety supervision and inspection of the company and did not find the 
fraud in training and assessment or the unhealthy management regime of the company.  
 
Government Policy and Legislation The wind force was unforeseen and not forecasted by 
meteorological departments due to their current technological capabilities. No dynamic ship 
survey system was available to authorities to monitor the conversions of ships. Necessary 
equipment under IMO regime, such as GMDSS, was not mandatory on domestic ships in China. 
 
As central government bodies,  the Ministry of Transport (MOT) and the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (MIIT) have the responsibility to set relevant policies, standards 
and regulations but they are not empowered to punish the entities for their faults. Sometimes 
they can advocate and require the local departments and companies to follow the safety 
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regulations by issuing provisions. But they cannot control the actual results.  
 
4.3.3 Summary 
The analysis found a number of key failures, all of which contributed to the Eastern Star Casualty. 
These failures were related to the equipment, the characteristics of the passengers, loopholes in the 
management regime of the company and the defective surveillance from all levels of 
administration. These causes have been analyzed with the framework of the AcciMap at the six 
levels and have also been catalogued into several aspects that relate to recommendations in the 
following chapters. 
4.4 An ActorMap of Sewol 
4.4.1Constructing an ActorMap of Sewol  
According to the investigation report into the Sewol accident, an ActorMap is drafted as shown 
in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 ActorMap of the Sewol casualty 
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4.4.2 Identify Actors and their responsibilities in Sewol 
At the government policy level, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) takes full 
responsibility for maritime safety in the Republic of Korea. 
 
At the time of the Sewol accident, three departments, the Shipping and Logistic Bureau, the 
Maritime Affairs and Safety Policy Bureau and Korean Coastguard, were under MOF and carried 
out some administrative responsibilities on behalf of MOF, according to national laws and 
regulations. They are at the regulatory bodies and associations level. Besides these three 
departments, Korea Shipping Association and Korea Register of Shipping acted as technical 
associations and conducted surveys and related technical tasks authorized by MOF. 
 
At the local area government level, Jeju local office, Mokpo Coast Guard and Jeju Coast Guard 
were in charge of local maritime safety and the local VTS of Jeju and Jindo. 
 
At the company management level, Sewol belonged to Chonghaejin Marine Company Ltd., major 
shareholders of which are Haiti (39.4%), Kim Han-sik (11.6%), and I.ONE.I (7.1%). The company 
was actually controlled by Yoo Byung-Eun who was the president of SaeMo Group. 
4.4.3 Summary 
As the highest authority, MOF takes responsibility for defining the national maritime safety 
system for domestic passenger ships in the form of policies and regulations. Under its leadership, 
the Shipping and Logistic Bureau, the Maritime Affairs and Safety Policy Bureau and the Korean 
Coastguard have operational responsibility and supervise associations like the Shipping 
Association and Korea Register of Shipping on behalf of MOF. There are some branches and 
sub-branches carrying out similar responsibilities in the local domain. 
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4.5 An AcciMap of Sewol 
4.5.1Drawing an AcciMap 
Similar to the Eastern Star, after actors were identified, the Sewol AcciMap can be draw as 
shown in Figure 14 with cause identification and analysis.
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Figure 14 AcciMap of the Sewol casualty 
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4.5.2 Explanations 
Accidental flow of events and acts Firstly, the Accident flow of Sewol can be concluded in a 
series of events as shown by the line with red arrows. The accident occurred at 20km north of 
Screen Island, Ronan County, where the natural conditions are complicated. The inexperienced 
helmsman felt the rudder angle was significantly larger than normal steering and was 
unsuccessful in the attempt to maintain maneuverability. The large rudder angle made the ship list 
heavily and the ship capsized in the near coastal sea. The inadequate awareness of risk of the 
passengers, the improper actions of the captain and the delay in SAR increased the loss of lives 
to 304 in the end. 
 
Topography and configuration of scenery and equipment The submarine topography where the 
accident occurred is rather complicated with a number of underwater obstructions. It is difficult 
for the ship to navigate under the influence of wind, stream, wave, surge, and fog. The complex 
environment also brought out problems for rescue. The waters where the accident occurred were 
about 30-meter deep with a 0.5 m wave height and 11.7 degrees Celsius water temperature. The 
visibility was only 20 cm for SAR and the flow rate reached 8 km / h. 
 
The crew did not close the watertight doors according to the regulations. The ship listed 
dangerously in one direction, resulting in flooding in watertight compartments. Flooding could 
have been avoided if internal watertight devices had been in place. The staff’s negligence sped 
up the capsizing. 
 
Vehicles on board were not well fastened. When different kinds of vehicles were loaded, they 
should have been fastened to prevent displacement during transportation. When the accident 
occurred, 180 cars, 22 trucks and 34 sets of trucks over 2.5t were not effectively fastened with a 
chain or rope, resulting in heavy movement. 
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Technical and operational management involved A malfunction in the rudder equipment was 
identified in the investigation report. The materials for rudder maintenance applied by Sewol 
were aging due to their long existence. The problematic rudder device caused a significant error 
when steering. The ship continued rotating until the rudder reached the maximum steering angle 
so that the ship was out of control. When navigating in the complicated waters, the young 
helmsman operated the ship improperly with a sharp turn from 135 to 150 degrees. The Sewol 
began to list to port and tilted towards the water while the captain was not on the bridge. The 
overall effect was that the ship turned about 45 degrees to the right and rotated 22 degrees on the 
spot for a span of 20 seconds. The cargo fell to one side of the ship causing the Sewol to lose all 
of its restoring force and allowing water to flow into the ship through the side door of the 
cargo-loading bay and the car entrance located at the stern.  
 
Excessive and problematic modifications were made to the Sewol. At the time of its purchase by 
Chonghaejin Marine on 2012, the ship that would come to be known as the Motor Vessel (MV) 
Sewol was 18 years old and dilapidated. It was first named Ferry Naminoue and was operated 
from 1994 to 2012 as a transport ship for cargo and passengers by the Japanese company A-Line 
Ferry. After it was purchased on 8 October 2012, the vessel was registered by Chonghaejin on 22 
October 2012 and underwent modifications from 12 October 2012 to February 12, 2013. The 
modifications were based on an illegal redesign of the ship. After the modifications, which 
included the addition of extra passenger cabins on the third, fourth, and fifth decks, Sewol's 
passenger capacity was increased from 804 to 956, including the crew, 180 vehicles, and 154 
regular cargo containers. The vessel weighed a total of 6,825 tons, and had 46 rubber lifeboats, 
each with a capacity of 45. It could travel at a maximum of 22 knots (41km/h; 25mph) and its 
weight was increased by 187 tons. The modifications resulted in the ship’s center of gravity 
being moved upward by 0.51m (1ft. 8in) as well as a left-right imbalance. 
 
The ship was seriously overloaded. According to the documents quoted by the Associated Press, 
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during the total 394 voyages between Incheon and Jeju after modifications, the overloading 
times reached as many as 246 and among them there were 136 times of loading cargo over 
2,000t and 13 times of more than 3,000t. On April 16, when the accident occurred, Sewol carried 
more than 400 passengers, 180 cars, 22 trucks and 34 sets of trucks over 2.5t, with a total weight 
of 3,608t, which was 3.66 times the full load.  This was almost the worst overloading on record. 
It was easy to capsize in such an overloaded condition, especially when encountering bad 
weather like wind, rain, snow, or fog.  
 
Interestingly, the Sewol was equipped with enough advanced escaping facilities,  but only two 
among 44 lifeboats were opened and 4 escape ships, which can accommodate over a thousand of 
persons, were not opened at all in the accident. When in a state of emergency, the captain did not 
make an effective response. Since the captain misjudged the dangerous situation and lack of 
capability to deal with emergencies, he failed to organize the crew to take timely measures to 
help the passengers, including guiding the passengers to evacuate immediately to the place 
where the lifeboats and life rafts were placed. Even when Jindo control center told the captain to 
direct the passengers to wear lifejackets as soon as possible for emergency evacuation and escape, 
the crew did not completely fulfill the corresponding duties. It is the captain and crew’s weak 
risk knowledge and skills that resulted in missing the best time for escaping.  
 
Company management and local area planning The Sewol did not follow the course suggested 
by MOF and navigated a course with many shoals, reefs, islands and other obstacles. Stranding, 
grounding and other accidents often occurred in those areas. The accident happened in an area with 
many obstacles and the helmsman had planned to escape from the dense obstacles and steered 
sharply, which resulted in the accident.  
 
Main passengers on the Sewol were juveniles who had lack of sense of crisis and were not 
trained to cope with the dangerous situation on board. Video records illustrated that some 
students kept playing even when the broadcast required them to don lifejackets. Since it was time 
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for breakfast, many passengers were trapped in the downstairs shops, restaurants and 
entertainment venues, which were difficult to escape. When sinking into the water, they could only 
survive a short time due to the cold water and scarce air.  
 
Jindo Traffic Control Centre (VTS) staff did not follow the provisions to maintain monitoring, 
made false exchange records and attempted to delete the electronic surveillance files when 
investigated by prosecutors.  
 
The Captain and crew did not take responsibility in the emergency. The inexperienced helmsman 
was incapable of controlling the ship by herself especially in a complicated situation while the 
captain left her alone. The captain even abandoned the ship, leaving most of the passengers still 
in danger. Neither the captain nor crew received adequate training especially in the knowledge 
and capability to cope with emergency situations. 
 
Regulatory bodies and associations From October 2012 to February 2013, the Sewol was 
subjected to a 5-month testing period by the South Korean Register of Shipping, after which the 
Register approved the modifications made. However, the Register decreased the authorized cargo 
capacity by half to 987 tons and required 2,000 tons of water to serve as ballast in order to 
provide balance. The upward stability was not seen as a potential risk when the Sewol was 
registered. 
 
The Government's Audit and Inspection Board later revealed that the Register's licensing was 
based on falsified documents. Prosecutors later estimated that 1,077 tons of cargo was 
permissible and that 1,695 tons of ballast was necessary to carry 1,077 tons of cargo. The 
overload problem was very serious in the SEWOL and happened quite frequently in past voyages. 
However,  it failed to draw enough attention and was not punished by relevant organizations. 
 
STCW regulates that the duties on a ship arranged by captains should be suitable for safe 
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navigation. Obviously, the captain of the Sewol did not make a reasonable duty arrangement. In 
addition, the captain should help everyone on board to escape and is bound to be the last person 
to leave the ship in distress, according to international practice. In this case, the captain was 
among the first group of people rescued, while most passengers were still in the capsizing ship. 
Compared with international conventions, the requirements and training for captains and crew of 
domestic ships are neither mandatory nor adequate. 
 
Government Policy and Legislation After the incident, the Korean navy, fire department, police, 
and coastguard dispatched a total of 16 helicopters and 24 ships to carry out the emergency rescue, 
and offshore fishing vessels in the vicinity also were involved in the rescue work. The Ministry of 
Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea even collected volunteers from around the country 
who could dive to join the SAR task. American Richard amphibious assault ship (USS Bonhomme 
Richard (LHD 6)) and synergistic ship-borne helicopters were involved in the rescue. However, 
SAR process did not have a successful result for the reasons of delayed emergency response, 
confused disaster information report, poor coordination with the victims and inadequate scientific 
and technological support.  
 
4.5.3 Summary 
The failures identified and analyzed in the Sewol accident, with the help of AcciMap, include 
complicated navigation environment factors, responsibilities of captain and crew, the 
profit-oriented shipping company without basic safety concerns and inadequate governance. 
Similar to the Eastern Star accident, AcciMap is also helpful in providing recommendations that 
will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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5 Comparison of the two accidents 
 
Coincidently, the two Asian accidents, Eastern Star and Sewol, have some major points in 
common. Both ships involved in the accidents were initially built in 1994 and were retrofitted 
several times. IMO conventions were not applicable to these ships since both were involved in 
domestic shipping. These accidents resulted in considerable loss of lives and had similar safety 
management issues. A comparison of the accidents will assist in carrying out safety assessment of 
the risks in domestic shipping in China and the Republic of Korea. Risk mitigation options may 
allow application of IMO conventions in the national domain for amelioration of safe and 
environmentally friendly shipping. Respective administrations should pay more attention to these 
comparisons to avoid repetition of such accidents. 
 
Combined with the above content of this study, a comparison will be made at two levels of factual 
information and identified failures by AcciMap.
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5.1 Comparison of factual information 
Table 12. Factual information comparison between Eastern Star and Sewol 
Information Eastern Star Sewol 
Ship type Cruise ship Ro-Ro passenger/cargo ship 
Capacity 534 passengers and 50 crew 921 passengers, 35 crew, 180 vehicles and 154 regular cargo 
containers 
Built and 
modifications 
Initial build in 1994 and retrofitted in 1997, 2008 
and 2015 
Initial build in 1994 and retrofitted in 2013 
Persons/cargos on 
board during accident 
398 passengers and 46 crew  446 passenger and 30 crew, 185 vehicles, 150 containers and 1157 
tons of cargo  
Ship company Chongqing Eastern Shipping Corporation, 
invested and administrated by Wanzhou District 
SASAC of Chongqing 
Sewol belonged to Chonghaejin Marine company; major 
shareholders were Haiti (39.4%), Kim Han-sik (11.6%), I.ONE.I 
(7.1%). It was actually controlled by Yoo Byung-Eun, President of 
SaeMo Group. 
Accident area Yangtze River of China Donggeochado of the Republic of Korea 
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Accident time At 21:30 on June 1, 2015 On the morning of 16 April, 2014 
Passengers on board Most of the passengers were over 60 years old 
from a tourist group named Red Sunset.  
Main passengers in Sewol were students from Danwon High 
School. 
Sinking time The accident occurred due to inclement weather 
and lead to capsizing followed by sinking in 2 
minutes.  
The ship sank after more than 3 hours post capsizing. 
 
5.2 Comparison of identified failures  
Table 13. Identified failures comparison between Eastern Star and Sewol 
Identified failures Eastern Star Sewol 
Accidental flow of 
events and acts 
The ship encountered severe weather, causing unsuccessful 
attempt to maintain maneuverability. It capsized into the 
river immediately and passengers on board had difficulty to 
escaping from the ship and no distress message was passed.  
The inexperienced helmsman observed that the rudder 
angle was significantly larger than normal steering, which 
led to a loss of maneuverability. Excessive list was 
resultant from the large rudder angle, causing the ship to 
capsize in coastal sea. 
Topography and At the time of accident, a squall line system appeared The accident occurred in a narrow channel with torrential 
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configuration of 
scenery 
above the waters where Eastern Star navigated, 
accompanied with downburst, tornadoes and other 
short-term local heavy rainfall coupled with severe 
convective weather. Waters where the ferry capsized 
suffered strong storms with the wind speed-reaching 
maximum to 32-38m/s (Bf 12-13). 
water but not at its peak time. 
Equipment The watertight doors in engine area were left open and 
beds in cabin were secured seaman like. 
The watertight doors were left open.  
Vehicles on board were not well fastened.  
Technical and 
operational 
management 
The company manipulated ballast water tanks during the 
conversion in 2015 and did not report to authorities. This 
conversion impaired the stability of the ship.  
Automatic closing devices were not fitted to watertight 
doors and were not noticed during the daily checks. The 
ship was not well maintained and potential risks were not 
controlled ahead. 
 
 
The rudder equipment malfunction was discovered in the 
investigation report. 
The excessive and problematic modifications resulted in its 
centre of gravity being shifted upward by 0.51m (1ft. 8in) 
as well as a left-right imbalance. 
The ship was seriously overloaded. 
Effective response was missing from Captain during the 
emergency. 
Escape routes were adequate and different facilities for 
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escape existed, but were not used capably. 
Company management The Eastern Star was directed to compensate for the time 
lost previously by keeping the original schedule leading to 
continuation of navigating in dangerous weather 
conditions. 
The company manipulated the ballast tanks without 
inspections from local professional institutions.  
The captain and senior officers onboard were not trained 
adequately especially for the response to extreme weather 
conditions. 
Sewol did not follow the course as suggested by MOF and 
navigated close to many shoals, reefs, islands and other 
dangers around.  
The inexperienced helmsman was incapable to control the 
ship by herself especially in a complicated situation in the 
absence of captain. The captain and other crewmembers 
abandoned the ship leaving most of passengers to their fate. 
Local area planning Most of the passengers were over 60 years old and the 
accident happened at their sleeping time. The limitation of 
their mobility and the short response time made it 
impossible to escape.  
The monitoring systems were not under dynamic tracking 
and the VTS operators were not following the 
development. 
Main passengers in Sewol were juveniles lacking sense of 
crisis and were not trained to cope up with dangerous 
situations onboard. 
Jindo Traffic Control Centre (VTS) staff failed to monitor 
continuously followed by falsifying records and tried to 
deleting electronic surveillance files while prosecution was 
in progress. 
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Regulatory bodies and 
associations 
The authorities issued the waterway transport licenses 
without careful survey.  
The safety management system of the company and crew 
training were not supervised effectively.  
The problematic modifications were not noticed.  
The missing closing devices required by regulations were 
not found out during inspections. 
The surveillance system of relevant local administrations 
did not play a full role in safety management on ships. 
The Republic of Korea government's Audit and Inspection 
Board later revealed that the Register's licensing was based 
on falsified documents. 
The upward stability was not looked as a potential risk 
when the Sewol was registered. 
The overload problem was very serious in SEWOL and it  
happened quite a number of occasions in the past voyages 
but went unnoticed and therefore was not punished by 
relevant organizations. 
Government policy and 
legislation 
 
The wind force was accidental and not forecasted by 
meteorological departments due to the current 
technological capabilities.  
No dynamic ship survey system was existed to monitor the 
modifications carried out for the ships by any of the 
authorities. Necessary equipment like GMDSS under IMO 
regime was not mandatory on domestic ships in China. 
The process of SAR was not a successful one from the result 
for the reasons of lag emergency response, confused disaster 
information report, poor coordination with the victims and 
inadequate scientific and technology support.  
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5.3 Summary 
Similarities and differences can easily be concluded from the above tables. As far as the factual 
information is concerned, both accidents caused a huge loss of life, while the time and weather 
conditions were quite different, leading to the great difference in number of survivors. The weather 
conditions that the Eastern Star encountered were extremely severe and peculiar, and the Sewol 
was reported to start sailing in foggy conditions and suffered from the complicated topography. 
The natural situation directly caused or catalysed the accidents. However, the accidents could have 
been avoided if the companies had carried out the safety management regulations and stopped the 
navigations in time. 
 
Similar enforcement, regulatory, management and training gaps can be found from the comparison. 
The modifications impaired the stabilities and the situation went unnoticed and uncorrected by 
authorities. Maintenance and daily safety checks were not adequate and some problematic 
equipment was not detected. Training programs such as contingency planning and emergency 
preparedness for captain and crew were inadequate. Generally, the regulations on the domestic 
ships both in China and the Republic of Korea were not as strict as that on ships under IMO 
regime. 
 
In the Eastern Star case, the unsuitable procedures sometimes constrained the results of 
surveillance and disciplinary action to the problematic companies could not be taken in time. 
 
In the Sewol case, there were some unsuitable procedures in SAR, which were not organized 
effectively and efficiently to enable a fast response in rescuing and saving more lives. 
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6 Discussions and findings 
6.1 Contributions of AcciMap  
The analysis of the tragic capsizing of Eastern Star and Sewol was approached from the 
multi-layered diagrams by examining weaknesses in the safety control structure. The approach of 
AcciMap has served three main aims of the paper: 
 Identification of the actors involved in the accidents and relationship among them for 
further deliberation of the failures. 
 Illustrated questions according to the layers in AcciMap and uncovered the rationale 
behind the decisions made leading to such a high number of fatalities. 
 Formulated safety recommendations by classifying the causes associated with different 
problems and developing relevant compensation in the future. 
 
As Leveson (2011) pointed out, if the purpose of accident analyses is to find the ‘‘root cause” or 
someone to blame, we might lose the sight to seek potential opportunities to maximize what can be 
learned from the accident.  
 
The Eastern Star accident happened in extreme weather conditions that led to the huge loss of life. 
Through post analysis using AcciMap, human factors can be identified clearly. The ship’s 
company undertook modifications without approval from the local inspection department and the 
lead department also failed to check the same. The training imparted to captain and crew was 
inadequate and they were, therefore, unable to cope up with the complicated situation while 
navigating in such harsh weather conditions. The safety equipment was not checked prior to 
sailing or during rounds.  
 
The rudder command – regardless of whether it was a flawed human decision or a technical error, 
should not be addressed as a primary explanation for the Sewol accident. The financial incentives 
and cost-cutting efforts of ship-owners led the vessel to an alarming high-risk state, making it more 
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vulnerable to accidents. Government regulatory agencies and industry associations failed to 
enforce proper constraints. Moreover, effective feedback channels to report safety critical 
information to authorities were not established. The activities carried out on board were not 
monitored in respect to correctness. Thus, the improperly designed vessel safety control structure 
with unbalanced responsibility created an unacceptably hazardous condition. Authorised 
personnel responsible for taking decisions regarding vessel conversion design, approval, cargo 
arrangement, crew management, vessel operation and inspection w ere  either ignored or unaware 
of the negative impact of their decisions on other parts in the safety systems (Kim, Nazir, & 
Øvergård, 2016). 
 
The AcciMap provided the logical levels for causal factors and connections analysis. It enables the 
compilation of large amounts of information regarding different causes of accidents, the area of the 
socio-technical system in which each factor arose and precisely how the factors came together to 
produce the accident, within a single coherent diagram. The approach promoted a systematic view 
of accident causation and focused on repairing system deficiencies to mitigate future accidents 
rather than reprimanding the individual involved and leaving the deficiencies that promoted their 
actions unaddressed. In addition, it assisted in safety recommendation development relating to the 
high levels regarding legislation, regulations, certification, auditing and government decisions. 
6.2 Constraints and future improvements 
Constraints were experienced in collecting evidence. Maximum information was retrieved from 
the investigation reports in local languages. Inappropriate understanding due to local language and 
translation may impair the accurate analysis. The causes identified from the investigation report 
could not be completed and well fitted in the AcciMap levels. Due to the complicated 
administrative procedures both in China and the Republic of Korea, the liabilities are not easy to 
be concluded at higher levels. The quality of the analysis produced by AcciMap entirely depends 
upon the quality of the input data used. Accurate and comprehensive data is not always available 
as much of the investigation may be based on assumptions, domain knowledge and expertise. The 
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output does not explicitly generate remedial measures or countermeasures and these are based 
entirely on analyst judgment, leading to reduce the reliability. 
 
For example, in the Sewol case, few components were indeed operated ‘reliably’ in terms of 
making decisions (e.g., KR) based on their context and information they possessed. However, poor 
coordination and communication, and dysfunctional interaction among the components of the total 
safety system played a critical role in leading to the dangers involved and escalation to an accident. 
Obviously, many of these systemic casual factors are only indirectly related to the immediate 
events and conditions (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016). 
 
It is very difficult to ease the burden of the affected people whose lives have been changed post 
accident. However, the Eastern Star and Sewol tragedies impart an important lesson for the 
passenger transport industry. They highlight the need for taking a system approach to the detection 
and prevention of breaches of safety constraints and calls for curative actions at both national and 
international level. Only then can we supersede the quick fixes of symptoms provided by 
individual components of the system and get to the true cure.  
 
In the future, other socio-technical methods for accident investigation are suggested to be applied 
in such casualty analysis and, hence, may lead to more beneficial results.   
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7 Recommendations and conclusions  
7.1 Recommendations  
The AcciMap not only analyses the route causes of the accident, but can also assist in concluding 
recommendations by classifying the causes. At least 8 aspects regarding enforcement gaps, 
regulatory gaps, unsuitable procedures, company negligence, training and qualifications, and 
license and market pressures have been identified and recommendations will be illustrated in Table 
14 and Table 15. 
 
Generally, in the Eastern Star case, from strategic design, policies should put safety management 
in domestic waters at an equal level to international areas for MOT. Standards of ship construction, 
especially while undertaking modifications, should be regulated in more detail for MIIT. IMO 
conventions or at least the principles for maritime safety should be made compulsory in domestic 
waters to avoid risks by MSA. Training for the crew of inland waterways should be strengthened in 
parallel. Local governments should be stricter and carry out effective surveillance in the future. A 
safety management system should be strictly followed, coupled with a tight assessment system by 
the ship’s company. 
 
For the case of the Sewol, the high level recommendations mainly focus on SAR and training due 
to the greater number of human factors involved in this accident compared with the Eastern Star. 
 
Detailed recommendations are listed in Tables 14 and 15. 
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Table 14. Recommendations for Eastern Star 
 
Catalogues Causes Recommendations 
Enforcement gaps Authorities did not notice the missing 
closing devices required by reg. 
Authorities should be responsible and careful when making annual inspections and 
should follow up on ships with higher potential safety risks. 
Authorities did not notice the ballast water 
modifications 
Inadequate training for the captain and 
crew 
Companies should strengthen training for their captains and crew. Sufficient 
simulations are necessary for staff on board to master the knowledge to handle all 
kinds of situations. 
The authorities should organize some enforcement training programs and exams to 
test the capabilities of the crew. 
Company did not report the modification 
to authorities 
Ship companies should not hide anything related to safety for profit. 
Serious penalties should be instituted on the companies if any enforcement gaps 
are found. Company did not conduct effective 
tracking and monitoring of the ship 
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Regulatory gaps No dynamic monitoring ship survey 
system 
Dynamic monitoring ship survey system should be applied to follow up the 
conversions of ships. 
GMDSS equipment not required by 
regulations 
Regulations for ships navigating inland waterways should be stricter. 
Technological standards should be improved to guarantee the safety performance 
of domestic ships.  
Authorities set operational limits at wind 
force BF 9 
The navigation restriction when encountering adverse weather in Changjiang is 
suggested to be adjusted as follows: (1) a ship can not sail and should take effective 
measures to avoid strong winds when the wind force is forecasted over BF 7 
(includingBF7) either at the departure port or the navigating routes. (2) When 
visibility at the departure ports is less than 1000 meters, the ship is prohibited from 
departing or leaving the port. When visibility during voyages is less than 1500 
meters downstream or 1000 meters uplink, the anchor should be suspended. 
Escape routes were narrow following an 
earlier conversion 
More stringent checks on ships should be made in the future. 
Management gaps Authorities did not supervise and monitor 
crew training 
Necessary system for training should be set by authorities both for training and 
assessment.  
Company Automatic closing devices were not fitted Companies should improve the level of safety management and self-checks. 
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negligence to watertight doors Authorities should regulate more strictly and make more inspections of the 
companies. Company manipulated ballast water tanks 
Ship was not well maintained  
Furniture in the cabins is movable 
Unsuitable 
procedures 
VTS operator was not following the 
development 
The duties and equipment on VTS should be strengthened. 
An effective and efficient emergency reporting system should be built to facilitate 
the SAR. Complicated procedure to alarm central 
SAR services 
Market pressure Keep navigating in bad weather to catch 
the tourist plan 
Profit pursuit should be balanced with safety management and safety should take 
the priority position. 
Cut the ship maintenance cost for lower 
ticket price  
License Authorities issue water transport permit 
without careful survey 
More stringent procedures should be taken before issuing permits and regular 
audits should be made after issuance. 
Training/ 
Qualification 
Unsuccessful attempts to maintain 
maneuverability 
Training for improved knowledge and skills on manoeuvring should be 
strengthened. 
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Table 15. Recommendations for Sewol 
 
Catalogues Causes Recommendations 
Enforcement gaps Authorities did not notice overload Thorough improvements should be carried out on the entire safety control 
structure, proper measuring channel, such as feedback that reflects the 
effectiveness of safety constraints need to be designed for continuous 
improvement and corrective action (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016). 
 
Authorities did not notice the falsified 
documents when registering 
Vehicles were not well fastened 
Watertight door was lashed open 
Regulatory gaps Lower standards for the training of the 
captain and crew of domestic ships 
The requirements for the captain and crew should be improved to an 
international level. The captain and crew should master knowledge and skills to 
cope with different situations. And they should know how to behave in an 
emergency. Company 
negligence 
Inadequate training for the captain and crew 
 Ship conversion causes the center of gravity 
to move upward 
The safety limits of the vessel should be based on the shipyard’s original design 
and the level of upgrading with respect to increased requirements or limits. A 
thorough risk assessment should be routinely carried out to ensure safe working 
practices. Continuous monitoring of risk and identifying potential areas of 
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concern before they develop into hazards should be given priority. Constrain 
hazards before they lead to accidents.  
 Rudder equipment malfunction 
Captain was not in the bridge during 
complicated situation 
The ship’s command should desist from taking risks and give absolute priority 
to the safety of the vessel and passengers, which also includes the securing of 
cargo and provision of a sufficiently intact lashing system in accordance with 
requirements to maintain ship stability.   No effective evacuation was organized by 
captain 
Unsuitable 
procedures 
Ship did not follow the route recommended 
by authorities 
Establish integrated and corporate safety information system to maintain 
accurate process (mental) models of all system controllers to assist in decision 
making.  
SAR was not organized in time Coast guard was cancelled after the accident for the negligence and a more 
scientific SAR was built in the Republic of Korea. 
Training/ 
Qualification 
Unsuccessful attempts to maintain 
maneuverability 
Crew of Ro-Ro passenger ships should be properly trained for accurate and 
immediate actions during emergency, and should have clear instructions on 
maximizing their vessels’ chances of survival in cases of water ingress to the car 
deck. The training should address day-to-day shipboard operations, risk 
assessment procedures as well as contingency planning and emergency 
Large rudder angle made the ship list heavily 
Captain and crew took wrong measures in 
emergency 
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VTS operator was not following the 
development 
preparedness. 
Market pressure Serious cargo overload Profit pursuit should be balanced with safety management and safety should 
take the priority position. More stringent punishment regulations should be 
carried out in the future. 
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7.2 Conclusions 
Despite the endeavours of international organizations, flag and port administrations and 
classification societies in terms of promulgating regulations and requirements that make the 
maritime industry safer overall, the responsibility for ensuring the safety of ships, crew and 
passengers must initiate from the owners themselves. The reality calls for a cost-effective safety 
management approach that balances safety with economy, efficiency, and performance constraints, 
which do not cause the degradation of safety efforts over time.  
 
After comparing several popular investigation methods, AcciMap was chosen as a harmonized 
approach to be applied in identifying and analysing the causes of the Eastern Star and Sewol 
accidents due to its advantages in organizational factor analysis and regarding recommendations to 
be formulated. Factual information was collected and ordered for the drawing of an ActorMap and 
AcciMap. ActorMaps were made to identify the actors involved in the accidents in order to prepare 
the draft of the AcciMap. Based on the investigation reports and factual information, AcciMaps of 
the Eastern Star and Sewol accidents were drafted separately. Relationships behind the root causes 
described in these two diagrams were illustrated according to the six levels of AcciMap. The six 
levels are listed as: topography and configuration of scenery and equipment, accidental flow of 
events and acts, technical and operational management involved, company management and 
local area planning, regulatory bodies and associations and government policy and legislation. 
These levels combined with cataloguing the causes can develop relevant recommendations. At the 
same time, a comparison of the two accidents was made from factual information and identified 
failures based on the AcciMap. The comparison listed the causes in tables, making it easy to find 
the similarities and differences in the two accidents. Further measures should be taken to prevent 
the repetition of accidents on domestic ships. 
 
This research made some progress in the application of AcciMap in two significant events and 
provided some measures to prevent the repetition of similar tragedies in the future. However, 
further research is welcome to be developed due to the constraints both in the approach itself and 
 74 
information collection. The cases of the capsizing of the Eastern Star and Sewol ferry surely still 
have a lot of unsolved questions. This study provided some new insights to encourage further 
discussion and research into the establishment of effective measures for national and international 
maritime safety control and management.  
 
  
 75 
References 
Chen, Y. H., & Zhang, H. W. (2007). The guest rolls ponder the ship scene management by 
supervision graduation inspection pattern. China Water Transport,7(4). 
Gao, Y. (2011). A study on construction path for service-oriented maritime with public 
administration theories (Doctoral dissertation, Dalian Maritime University, 2011). Dalian, 
China. 
George, R. (2013). Ninety percent of everything: Inside shipping, the invisible industry that puts 
clothes on your back, gas in your car, and food on your plate. New York: Metropolitan 
Books/ Henry Holt and. 
Han, Y. (2011). Advanced grid mode in marine management (Doctoral dissertation, Fudan 
University, 2011). Shanghai, China. 
Harms-Ringdahl, L. (2004). Relationships between accident investigations, risk analysis, and 
safety management. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 111(1-3), 13-19. 
doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2004.02.003 
Hollnagel, E. (2012). FRAM, the functional resonance analysis method: Modelling complex 
socio-technical systems. Farnham, Surrey, UK England: Ashgate. 
Hong, B. G., & Yu, Y. (2000). Safety assessment of Ro-Ro passenger ship. Journal of Dalian 
Maritime University, 26(2), 44-47. doi:10.3969/j.issn.1006-7736.2000.02.012 
IMO. (2008). Casualty investigation code: Code of the international standards and recommended 
practices for a safety investigation into a marine casualty or marine incident. London: 
International Maritime Organization. 
IMO. (2016a). Status of Conventions: Summary of Status of Conventions. Retrieved from 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx 
IMO. (2016b). GISIS: Marine Casualties and Incidents – Casualty Data from IHS. Retrieved 
from https://gisis.imo.org/Secretariat/MCI/IHSData.aspx. 
Jalonen, R., & Salmi, K. (2009). Safety Performance Indicators for Maritime Safety Management. 
Helsinki: Helsinki University of Technology. Retrieved from 
http://www.merikotka.fi/metku/TKK-AM-9-1.pdf 
Ji, H. (2015). Safety supervision and management of smaller inland vessels. Technology 
Outlook, 27. 
Kim, T., Nazir, S., & Øvergård, K. I. (2016). A STAMP-based causal analysis of the Korean 
Sewol ferry accident. Safety Science, 83, 93-101. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2015.11.014 
Lee N., V. H., Donald K, L., & Randal L, M. (2005). Root cause analysis handbook: A guide to 
effective incident investigation (3rd Edition ed.). Brookfield, CT: Rothstein Associates. 
Li, B. Q., & Jin, H. H. (2009). Explore new paths on Ro-Ro passenger ship safety 
management. Marine Fire, 3, 36-39. 
Li, Z., & Wu, S. (2014). Analysis on the Causes of Sewol. China Water Transport, 14(10), 
53-55. 
 76 
Liu, D. (2015). Research and discussion on domestic cruise ships safety supervision. China 
Water Transport, 15(11), 77-78. 
Liu, G. C. (2002). Strengthen safety supervision and administration of marine Ro-Ro 
Freighters--On the promulgation of the provisions of. Modern Occupational Safety, 7. 
doi:10.3969/j.issn.1671-4156.2002.07.021 
Liu, Z. J. (2010). The trend of Ro-Ro passenger vessel development: lessons learned from the 
new safety measures adopted by IMO to enhance the Ro-Ro passenger ship safety. China 
Maritime Safety, 1. 
Mi, T., & Zhao, Q. (2015). Some Ideas about the Sewol Accident. Navigation Technology, 1, 
67-69. 
Quan, Y. Z. (2010). The analysis of situation and development of Ro-Ro passenger ship 
transportation in China. China Ports, 5, 55-56. 
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling problem. Safety 
Science, 27(2-3), 183-213. doi:10.1016/s0925-7535(97)00052-0 
Reason, J. T. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot, Hants, England: 
Ashgate. 
Salmon, P. M. (2011). Human factors methods and accident analysis: Practical guidance and 
case study applications. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Schröder-Hinrichs, J. U., Baldauf, M., & Ghirxi, K. T. (2009). Accident reporting deficiencies 
related to human and organizational factors in engine room fires on board ships. Theory 
and Applications Reliability, Risk, and Safety. doi:10.1201/9780203859759.ch37 
State of Administration of Work Safety. (2015). Number of marine casualties and incidents in 
Changjiang 2010-2014. 
Svedung, R. &. (2000). Proactive risk management in a dynamic society. Karlstad: Swedish 
Rescue Services Agency. doi: https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/16252.pdf 
UNCTAD. (2015a). UNCTADSTAT: Gross domestic product: Total and per capita, current and 
constant (2005) prices, annual, 1970-2014, (figure 1). Retrieved from 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96 
UNCTAD. (2015b). UNCTADSTAT: World seaborne trade by types of cargo and country groups, 
annual, 1970-2014. Retrieved from 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=32363 
Underwood, P., & Waterson, P. (2013). Systemic accident analysis: Examining the gap between 
research and practice. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 55, 154-164. 
doi:10.1016/j.aap.2013.02.041 
Wu, Y. (2014). Research On The Causes Of The “SEWOL” Accident. Journal of Nantong 
Vocational & Technical Shipping College, 13(3), 24-26. 
Xu, H. (2015). Research on the Emergency Response and Rescue of Sewol. China Emergency 
Rescue, 1, 39-41. 
 77 
Yu, H. B. (2008). SWOT Analysis and Countermeasures on Shenzhen maritime 
management (Doctoral dissertation, Fudan University, 2008). Shanghai, China (CHN). 
Zhang, J. (2001). Strengthening safety management for inland navigation vessels. Ship Safety 
and Countermeasures in case of storm Proceedings. 
Zhang, J. P. (2010). A regularity study on the safety control of Ro-Ro passenger ships in the 
Bohai Bay. China Maritime Safety, 1. 
Zhang, Z. J. (2014). The analysis on technical condition of domestic passenger ships. China Ship 
Survey, 9, 82-84. 
 
